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Abstract
This chapter traces the political origins of liberalism in the Warren- and post-Warren-era
federal judiciary. Rather than view these developments as a byproduct of unrestrained
judicial activists intent of following personal political agendas, I argue that it is more
accurate to begin with the self-conscious efforts of Democratic Party office-holders in the
1960s to transform the federal judiciary into a reliable carrier of New Frontier/Great
Society constitutional values. While account is consistent with the claim that the
Supreme Court should be seen as part of the “dominant governing coalition,” I also
explore the ways in which the Supreme Court exacerbated cleavages in that coalition and
triggered efforts to block or rollback those developments. Thus, the political significance
of 1960s Democratic entrenchment in the judiciary has as much to do with the way in
which the political system reacted to the liberalization of the federal judiciary as with the
resulting changes in constitutional policy making
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I. Introduction
It has been standard practice in public law scholarship to depict judges as selfinterested policy makers competing against other policy makers. Judicial behavioralism
fosters this one-against-the-other starting point by adopting a level of analysis that
focuses on the preferences of individual judges and by treating the sources of judicial
attitudes as exogenous to most models of decision making. Strategic approaches begin
with this same starting point but then explore whether the dynamics of collegial or interinstitutional decision making complicate the ways in which judges pursue their individual
preferences. 1 These approaches shed light on important aspects of judicial politics, but—
to use the lexicon of this volume—they do little to relate the “internal” points of view of
judges with the “external” goals and preferences of those power holders who create
courts and appoint judges.
This chapter explores the advantages of explaining changes in judicial
understandings of the Constitution—that is, non-textual “constitutional change”—with
reference to the policy agendas of national governing coalitions. Following Terri Peretti I
assume that ideological voting by judges “is not merely the arbitrary expression of [their]
idiosyncratic views [but rather] is the expression and vindication of those political views
deliberately ‘planted’ on” courts by policy-conscious presidents and senators. 2 Rather
than follow the standard practice in political science of analogizing judges to legislators,
this approach recommends viewing federal courts as analogous to other institutions (a)
whose officeholders are appointed rather than elected and (b) who are responsible for a
specialized subset of everyday policy-making and/or particularized decision making—
institutions such as bureaucratic agencies or independent regulatory commissions. For
many such institutions, a desire to affect the decision-making bias of those institutions is
foremost on the minds of those who are involved in staffing decisions; that is, power
holders want the Federal Reserve to follow a certain approach to monetary policy, they
want the Environmental Protection Agency to strike a certain balance between industry
and the environment, and so on. This concern about the overall decision-making bias of
an institution is especially pointed when it comes to judicial appointments, because
federal courts (ever since 1875) have decision-making authority over an extremely broad
range of policy issues. This makes it even more important for parties in government to
care about the political biases and allegiances of the nominee, which (along with
patronage considerations) is why presidents and senators overwhelmingly select federal
judges from among their own party activists or loyalists. 3
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Constitutional change, like changes in agency decision making, might result from
a number of factors, including new information about the consequences of older
decisions, the development of new constellations of interest-group lobbying, or the need
to address innovative issues. However, if there are times when it would seem natural to
explain changes in agency decision making (at least in part) by referring to the goals and
agendas of those who staff the agencies, then perhaps there are reasons to adopt the same
approach when trying to explain changes in the way judges interpret the Constitution. On
this view, to witness a shift on the Supreme Court from a more liberal to a more
conservative understanding of the Constitution is to witness something that is no different
in kind than a shift in the EPA from aggressive prosecution of industrial polluters to a
more business-friendly approach to environmental protection. Both are changes in
institutional behavior that, in all likelihood, can be traced to changing goals and agendas
of other power holders in the regime.
There are a number of different political goals that might be pursued by dominant
coalitions with an eye on courts, including simple support for a policy agenda (that is,
elimination of a potential veto point or promotion of a “legitimation” function), front-line
enforcement of special policies (e.g., the return of fugitive slaves, the protection of black
voting rights), the enhancement of “credible commitments” to favored constituencies, or
the construction of a forum into which potentially divisive political issues might be
channeled (such as slavery, antitrust policy, abortion, or even disputed presidential
elections). 4 In this chapter I argue that constitutional change in the United States
sometimes reflects an attempt at “political entrenchment”—that is, an effort of a
governing coalition to transform or fortify the policymaking bias of the federal judiciary
so that it is in a position to represent the goals of that coalition even if they lose control of
the Congress or presidency. Entrenchments become more conspicuous during periods of
close party competition where the more ideological wing of one party is fortuitously in a
position to gain representation of their views in federal courts before losing control over
the appointment process. 5 Even if such a strategy is driven by short-term political
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considerations rather than anticipation of a possible loss of power, the effort might
properly be considered “entrenchment” rather than mere “staffing” (as with the EPA)
because a federal judge’s tenure of office typically persists across a change in party
governance.
Previously I developed and applied this perspective to the efforts of the postReconstruction Republican Party. 6 I argued that by the mid-1870s party leaders had
begun to abandon a commitment to black civil rights in favor of a commitment to
conservative economic nationalism, and that the institutionalization of this policy was
largely accomplished through an expansion of federal judicial power. The party
accomplished this goal by using two brief (lame-duck) periods in which Republicans
controlled the presidency and the entire Congress to pass legislation expanding the
jurisdiction of federal courts (the Judiciary and Removal Act of 1875) and expanding the
size and structure of federal courts (the Evarts Act of 1891). Even though Republicans
lost the House of Representatives immediately after the passage of these acts they
maintained control of the presidency and the Senate (sometimes with less than a majority
of the popular vote for president, as in the case of Hayes in 1876 and Harrison in 1888),
and with those institutions they were able to staff federal courts with conservative
economic nationalists while at the same time fight off House Democratic efforts to
rollback federal judicial power.
This time I want to explore whether the concept of political entrenchment
provides a useful perspective for understanding the political origins of liberalism in the
Warren- and post-Warren-era federal judiciary. Rather than view these developments as
a byproduct of unrestrained judicial activists intent of following personal political
agendas, or even as a reflection of judges who act as if they are political blank-slates who
react to changes in public opinion, I want to see whether modern judicial liberalism can
be traced to the self-conscious efforts of Democratic Party office-holders in the 1960s. I
hope to show that there are important similarities between the actions of Democrats in the
1960s and Republicans in the latter part of the nineteenth century, especially the use of
legislation to reorganize and reconfigure access to federal courts, and the use of the
appointment power to fundamentally alter the decision-making bias of the federal
judiciary.
However, in order for this account to reflect the perspective of New
Institutionalist scholarship, it should be emphasized that “constitutional change as
partisan entrenchment” never quite works out as a simple story of judges merely acting as
faithful “agents” in service of their “principals.” In part the problem has to do with the
scope of the Court’s decision making: it is comparatively more difficult to find decision
makers who will be reliable on a wide range of issues than it is to find appointees who
will act reliably over a narrow-defined set of policies; that is, getting someone who will
do what you want over at the EPA is easier than getting a justice who will do what you
want within the expansive universe of “constitutional law.” Also, federal judges have
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6

“How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the United
States, 1875-1891,” American Political Science Review 96 (2002):511-524.

4

more decision making independence than many agency officials, and this means greater
opportunities to strike out in surprising directions. Moreover, justices must reconcile
their preferences with a web of “internal” institutional constraints, perspectives, and
responsibilities, including (perhaps) legal norms.
Finally, it is an axiom of historical institutionalism that institutional politics rarely
conforms to simple, linear models of causation or neatly schematized understandings of
political “order”; instead, it is assumed that institutional politics is comprised of multiple
orders and patterns of intercurrence which often create unintended consequences,
paradoxes, and disjunctions. Institutional change—including constitutional change—
inevitably triggers a dynamic whereby some mobilize in support of new developments
and others begin work to block or rollback those developments. Thus, the political
significance of 1960s Democratic entrenchment in the judiciary has as much to do with
the way in which the political system reacted to the liberalization of the federal judiciary
as with the resulting changes in constitutional policy making.
Still, before pursuing the case of the 1960s, more should be said about the idea of
political entrenchment as it relates to constitutional change.
II. Political Entrenchment and Judicial Politics
Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson recently proposed a “theory of partisan
entrenchment” as a way of understanding “how constitutional revolutions occur.” 7 In
their view, federal judges “resemble Senators who are appointed for 18-year terms [the
average tenure of a Supreme Court justice] by their parties and never have to face
election.” They define partisan entrenchment as precisely this “temporal extension of
partisan representation” that is so characteristic of the tenure of federal judges, and they
argue that this extension of partisan representation through presidential appointment “is
the best account of how the meaning of the constitution changes over time.” More
specifically, they argue that the balance of power between the president and the senate
often shapes whether presidents are in a position to entrench strong party ideologues or
party moderates. For example, even though Justices Blackmun and Scalia were both
Republicans who were appointed by Republican presidents, they turned out different
mostly because Nixon had to get an appointment through a Democratic Congress and
Reagan did not. As a rule, “judges—and particularly Supreme Court Justices—tend to
reflect the vector sum of political forces at the time of their confirmation.” 8 Presidents
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sometimes make notorious “mistakes” but a regrettable appointment “is a familiar feature
of democratic politics” whether one is talking about the judiciary or the cabinet. 9
One thing that prevents judges from being viewed as entrenched partisans is that
they tend to represent the political agenda that was most salient at the time of their
appointment. Unlike other elected partisans, they are under no pressure (as a condition of
holding onto power) to update their views based on new contexts, changing coalitions,
and evolving electoral strategies. New Deal justices did their work by upholding the
New Deal, and if later they diverged on issues relating to civil rights and liberties that
merely demonstrates that consensus on these issues was not a salient consideration for
Roosevelt when he made his appointments. The fact that John Paul Stevens is now
viewed as the Court’s leading liberal is not inconsistent with the view that he was
properly viewed as a life-long moderate Republican at the time of his appointment. 10 In
a nutshell:
If you stock the federal judiciary with enough Reagan Republicans, you can
expect that some fifteen to twenty years later they will be making a significant
impact on the structure of constitutional doctrine. And so they are…. Indeed,
given that the Democrats did not have a single Supreme Court nomination
between 1967 and 1993, it is hard to expect otherwise. If one doesn’t like the
decisions of the Rehnquist Court, one should really have been putting more
Democrats in the White House during the 1970s and 1980s. Put another way, if
you don’t like what the Court is doing now, you (or your parents) shouldn’t have
voted for Ronald Reagan. 11
Once we pay attention to the relationship between conventional partisan politics
and the shape of judicial decision making then (among other things) a more complicated
relationship emerges between democratic theory and decision-making by unelected
federal judges. At a minimum it should be acknowledged that the views represented by
judges have some relationship to views considered acceptable by members of the
dominant political coalition at some point in the (more or less) recent past, and it is very
likely that they will continue to reflect the views of some portion of the party in
government (e.g., the ideological wing of a previously majoritarian party). This
“temporal extension of partisan representation” also occurs when Senators are given
extended terms of office and (on a much more focused set of issues) when the board of
governors of the Federal Reserve are given fourteen-year terms of office. Moreover, we
should recall that parties “serve as sites for working out their adherents’ views about
constitutional politics. They collect, filter, co-opt and accumulate the constitutional
beliefs and aspirations of the party faithful, of prospective voters, and, perhaps equally
Constituents, Presidents, and Interest Groups in Supreme Court Confirmations,” American Journal of
Political Science 36 (Feb. 1992):96-121.
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crucially, of social movements.” 12 The successful entrenchment of these views by
victorious parties might be considered one of the principal goals of majoritarian electoral
politics. 13
Balkin and Levinson are essentially right about how Supreme Court appointments
determine constitutional change in the United States. My quibble is with their decision to
label all judicial appointments as instances of a political phenomenon known as
entrenchment. Instead, it may be useful to posit a variety of goals that governing
coalitions might have when considering how the federal judiciary fits into their political
agendas, only one of which might be the goal of using short-term control of key
institutions to protect potentially vulnerable policies from electoral politics. One leading
scholar of modern judicial appointments has suggested that there are at least three
different kinds of agendas that presidents pursue in making judicial appointments: policy
agendas, which refer to “the substantive policy goals of an administration, including its
legislative and administrative objectives”; partisan agendas, which refer to efforts “to
shore up political support for the president or for the party”; and personal agendas, which
refer to an effort to “favor a personal friend or associate.” 14 For example, after reviewing
the record of federal court appointments under Eisenhower, Sheldon Goldman concluded
that “Eisenhower did not consider the federal courts germane to his presidential agenda
and his administration” and thus his appointments reflected “partisan” and “personal”
considerations rather than “policy” considerations. 15 One might disagree with
Goldman’s assessment of Eisenhower’s record and still acknowledge that, in the course
of American constitutional history, there have been times when presidents have made
appointments with more attention to simple patronage considerations than to the use of
the judiciary to promote substantive political goals.
Also, if we are attentive to the condition of electoral vulnerability as a feature of
political entrenchment, it may be possible to distinguish those circumstances where
confident majority parties reconfigure the judiciary so that it is essentially in alignment
with dominant coalitions in the rest of the national government. 16 Relatedly, we may
want a separate category for those times when presidents and senators have focused more
on removing judicial barriers to preferred agendas—a strategy of antientrenchment—
rather than entrenching new agendas in courts. 17 One observable result of both of these
alternatives would be that the decision-making bias of courts should be in the direction of
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upholding national legislation (and thus reduce the appearance of judicial activism). By
contrast, one result of successful entrenchment would be a greater likelihood that national
legislation would be struck down, since it is a condition of entrenchment that courts
become (temporarily, anyway) out of sync with the prevailing constellation of power in
the rest of the political system. 18
Finally, during extended periods of divided government, when the political
context is not conducive either to a strategy of entrenchment or alignment (especially
when the presidency and the senate are controlled by different parties), it may be that
partisans in government choose a second-best strategy of simple compromise, whereby
they moderate their preferences and select what amounts to the median appointee. While
successful entrenchments may result in the Court being associated with a particular
ideological wing of a party, the politics of compromise appointments may lead to a Court
that seems to eschew sweeping declarations of constitutional principles in favor of a more
prudential role in the political system.
It also should be emphasized that, even when decision-makers intend a strategy of
entrenchment, it is not always the case that the strategy is successful. Perhaps the most
famous example of an attempted political entrenchment in American constitutional
history is the decision of the outgoing Federalist Party to (in the words of Thomas
Jefferson) “retire[] into the judiciary as a stronghold and from that battery all the works
of republicanism are to be beaten down and erased.” Balkin and Levinson cite this as an
exemplar of their analysis, arguing that “Chief Justice John Marshall kept Federalist
principles alive long after the Federalist Party itself had disbanded.” 19 But it is not
entirely clear that Marshall’s tenure as Chief Justice is an example of effective
entrenchment. The Judiciary Act of 1801 was quickly repealed, with the subsequent
approval of the Supreme Court. 20 When Congress began targeting judges for
impeachment the remaining Federalists on the bench quickly learned that they had to give
up on the hope of using their office as a partisan forum. 21 Over the years, John
Marshall’s Supreme Court did not challenge the dominant partisan coalitions in the
national government; in fact, it was careful to tailor its decisions in a way that was quite
conducive to the evolving preferences of the Virginia Dynasty. 22
More obvious examples of political entrenchment in federal courts (as I define it)
would be antebellum efforts by Southern politicians to construct five federal circuits that
exclusively covered slave-owning states (thus ensuring a pro-slavery majority on the U.S.
Supreme Court) and post-Reconstruction efforts by the Republican Party to transform the
18
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federal judiciary into a force for the promotion of conservative economic nationalism. In
both of these cases entrenchment involved, not simply favorable appointments, but also
broader legislative efforts to reorganize and restructure federal courts. Do the efforts of
the Democratic Party in the 1960s represent another example?
III. Partisan Entrenchment and the Creation of the New Frontier/Great Society
Judiciary 23
No one would mistake the late-1950s Supreme Court, or the federal judiciary
more generally, as a bastion of liberal decision making. The Supreme Court’s decision in
Brown v. Board of Education, while controversial in the South and among many
establishment lawyers in the ABA and elite law schools, was consistent with the urgings
of the solicitor general and was seen by many in the Eisenhower State Department as
vital for promoting the “image of American democracy” during the Cold War. 24 By the
end of the decade the Court attempted to extend some modest due process protections for
witnesses called before the House Un-American Activities Committee, but Congress
reacted strongly to these experiments and it was not long before the Court was in full
retreat. 25 There were only four reliable liberals on the Court: Brennan, Warren, Douglas,
and Black. Clark, Whittaker, Harlan, and Frankfurter had voting records that were
reliably conservative on most issues. Stewart was a moderate Republican with a
commitment to desegregation and free speech that was well-known before his
appointment by Eisenhower a few years after Brown. 26 In general, during the
Eisenhower administration, the Supreme Court handed down “liberal” decisions in civil
liberties cases about 58 percent of the time. 27 It was a very different Supreme Court, and
a different federal judiciary, by the end of the Johnson administration.
23
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In 1961 the Democratic Party took control of both the White House and the
Congress for the first time in eight years. At the time Eisenhower left office there were
163 Democratic and 163 Republican federal judges. 28 Over the next seven years
Congressional Democrats increased the size of the federal judiciary three times.
Immediately upon taking office, in July 1961, they added ten new appellate and sixtythree new district court judgeships (with Republican Senator Kenneth B. Keating
suggesting that “the present urgency for action … smacks strongly of patronage
politics”). 29 In 1966 they added another ten appellate and thirty-five district court
judgeships. 30 Another adjustment in 1968 created another thirteen circuit court
positions. 31 In other words, between 1960 and 1968 the total number of permanent
federal judges was increased by more than a hundred to 432, almost a 33 percent increase
in the size of the federal judiciary. 32
The Eisenhower administration had also pushed for an increase in federal
judgeships, and modest expansion (amounting to a release of pressure resulting from
extended congressional inaction) was authorized by a Republican Congress in February
1954. 33 However, after Democrats regained control of the Congress following the 1954
elections, legislators refused to give the Republican President the opportunity to fill more
judicial positions, despite the Judicial Conference’s pleas for as many as seventy new
judgeships. 34 As a last-ditch effort, Eisenhower’s Attorney General, William P. Rogers,
conveyed to Congressional Democrats that the president promised “to fill the posts on a
50-50 basis from the two parties.” 35 But in the months before the 1960 presidential
election Democrats gambled that they might get an even better deal if they waited to see
the result of the election. As explained by Representative Emanuel Celler, chairman of
the House Judiciary Committee, “Very frankly I believe they [congressional leaders]
contemplated a change in the Executive and the leadership gambled as it were—and
28
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won—that a new administration will make the appointments. That is nothing new in our
political history….” 36 And so, instead of passing in the Spring of 1960, the expansion
was authorized in the Spring of 1961.
As a result of this legislation, the Kennedy administration had the opportunity to
appoint a huge number of new federal judges. When the new positions were combined
with vacancies in preexisting positions the administration was faced with filling 147
positions. The chairman of the ABA’s Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary,
Bernard Segal, explained to the ABA House of Delegates on August 7, 1962, that “except
for Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, this is more vacancies than any President of the
United States has had to fill in two entire terms of office.” 37 By October 1962 the White
House, led by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy and a Justice Department team made
up of Byron White, Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, and Joseph F. Dolan, had received Senate
confirmation of 128 of their nominees. 38 The administration received two more
confirmations before Kennedy’s assassination, bringing the total number of judges
appointed by Kennedy to 130. 39
It would be implausible to assume that every one of these judges embodied the
spirit of the New Frontier. Southern Democratic control of key Senate committees gave
that wing of the party disproportionate influence over the fate of the president’s political
agenda, and the cultivation of that wing (combined with the practice of senatorial
courtesy on lower court appointments) ensured that some federal judgeships would
reflect the influence of Dixiecrat patronage. In March 1963 Governor Nelson A.
Rockefeller of New York charged that the president had been appointing “segregationist
judges” to the federal bench in the South, and the NAACP was critical of some of
Kennedy’s judges. 40 Senate politics also resulted in eleven Republican appointees (six of
whom were nominated by JFK but confirmed during Johnson’s administration). 41
Nevertheless, conscious efforts were made to ensure that these federal judges would have
a different orientation toward the law than their Republican predecessors. Katzenbach
declared that “judicial philosophy is important,” in the sense that (whenever possible) the
administration preferred “a judge who is a careful liberal, a good technician, liberal yet
cautious.” 42 More minority groups were represented than was the case with
36
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Eisenhower’s appointments, including twenty Catholics, eleven Jews, five blacks, and
three “foreign born” nominees; 43 by contrast, “unlike Roosevelt and Truman, Eisenhower
did not name even one woman or black to a lifetime judgeship on a court of general
jurisdiction.” 44 More specifically, a special effort was made to check the civil rights
attitudes of those who were nominated for judgeships in the South—especially important,
given that the Justice Department would be bringing cases in those jurisdictions and
wanted to ensure that they would receive a sympathetic hearing. 45 By contrast,
Eisenhower’s principal overseers on judicial nominations, Henry Brownell, William P.
Rogers, and Lawrence E. Walsh, focused mostly on a candidate’s feelings about law
enforcement, and especially (after 1957) whether they exhibited a useful antagonism
toward the U.S. Supreme Court with respect to decisions such as Mallory v. U.S. (a
unanimous decision). 46
Eisenhower’s team also worked more closely with the (then conservative)
American Bar Association, which was much less generous toward Kennedy’s liberal
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nominees than his precedessor’s conservative ones. 47 After the ABA rated James R.
Browning “unqualified” for a position on the Ninth Circuit, despite experience in private
practice, a stint in the Justice Department, and three years as a Supreme Court clerk, the
administration went ahead with the appointment largely on the strength of a memo
prepared by a Justice Department official (James Rowe) who emphasized Browning’s
liberalism and the fact that “the Ninth Circuit [is] a weak[,] conservative bench quite out
of step with the premises of the New Frontier…. In the great run of cases it does not
much matter whether a judge is liberal or conservative if he is a good judge. There are a
handful of cases, however … where the judicial mind can go either way, with probity,
with honor, self-discipline and even with precedent. This is where the ‘liberal’ cast of
mind … can move this nation forward, just as the conservative mind can and does hold it
back. This is intangible truth, but every lawyer knows it as reality!” 48
Johnson (with the assistance of John W. Macy, Jr., chairman of the Civil Service
Commission, Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach, and deputy attorney general
Ramsey Clark) could also make controversial appointments, most notably his decision to
nominate former Mississippi governor (and segregationist) James P. Coleman for a
position on the Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit, who was opposed by Senate liberals
as well as professors such as Thomas Emerson and Louis Lusky before eventually being
confirmed 76 to 8. 49 At the behest of North Carolina’s Democratic senators, Sam Ervin
and B. Everett Jordan, Johnson agreed to nominate Woodrow Wilson Jones to a federal
district court position, despite the fact that he had been a signatory of the Southern
Manifesto and was strongly opposed by the North Carolina NAACP. Examples such as
these reflected Johnson’s commitment to accommodate senatorial courtesy. 50 Still,
overall his choices reflected a concerted effort to reconstruct the ideological center of
gravity of the federal judiciary. Johnson, appointing judges in the wake of the Civil
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Rights Act of 1964, was even more insistent than Kennedy on thoroughly exploring his
nominees’ record on civil rights; “want this on every judge” was his general written
instruction, and presidential papers reveal consistent notes on the civil rights views of
potential candidates. 51 Johnson also made a serious effort to recruit African-Americans
into the federal judiciary—an unprecedented five percent of all his judicial
appointments. 52 Toward the end of his presidency, when opposition to Johnson became
more vocal, the president became more insistent that judges be loyalists to him personally
and to the goals of his administration. 53
Even when Kennedy and Johnson were forced to accommodate Senators in
making certain lower court appointments, they nevertheless attempted to find judges who
would not be obstructionist in the face of clear Supreme Court directives. As Katzenbach
explained it, they took steps to ensure that even more conservative appointees would
“follow the law of the land.” 54 This made the appointment of Supreme Court justices a
critical factor in reconstructing the overall decision-making bias of the federal judiciary.
Presidents do not always have this opportunity, but with four acceptable liberals on the
Court at the time of Kennedy’s inauguration the White House was in a position either to
fortify that wing or undermine it.
Despite the fact that Kennedy nominated a candidate who would eventually earn a
reputation for judicial conservatism, the evidence is clear that these Democratic
presidents were interested in appointing justices who would represent the more liberal
wing of their party. When in March 1962 the conservative Eisenhower appointee Charles
Whittaker informed the White House of his intention to retire from the Court the initial
assumption was that Kennedy would appoint Secretary of Labor Arthur J. Goldberg, who
had been promised the seat on at least “a half dozen” occasions. 55 However, Kennedy
concluded that he could not yet afford to part with his Labor secretary, who was actively
managing negotiations between U.S. Steel and the Steelworkers’ Union. Attention then
turned to Judge William Henry Hastie, the first black appointed to the federal circuit
bench and one of only two black circuit court judges (the other being Thurgood Marshall,
who was serving a recess appointment on the Second Circuit while awaiting a delayed
Senate confirmation). Ironically, though, the nomination of this potentially historic
candidate was sidetracked in part because the White House was explicitly trying to
accommodate the liberal wing of the Court. Opposition came from Chief Justice Earl
Warren and Justice William O. Douglas, who thought that Hastie was not liberal enough;
this, combined with Dolan’s assessment that the nomination would alienate Southern
Democrats in the Senate and “blow everything we’ve got going on the Hill” was enough
to shift the focus to a less controversial candidate, Kennedy loyalist Byron White, whose
reputation and legal credentials would ensure no political problems for the
51
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administration. 56 Five months later, when Felix Frankfurter announced his retirement
plans in August 1962 after suffering a stroke, Kennedy focused exclusively on Goldberg,
who had completed his primary mission to prevent a nationwide steel strike.57
By all accounts, Johnson assumed as early as 1964 that his first Supreme Court
appointee would be his close friend and advisor Abe Fortas. The president was so
insistent on making the appointment that he famously schemed to convince the Court’s
newest justice, Goldberg, to step down and accept the position of U.N. Ambassador.
While Johnson was single-minded about his choice of Fortas he did ask Katzenbach to
prepare a memo reviewing all possible options, and in that memo Katzenbach
emphasized the importance of appointing a Democrat (in order to avoid giving the
Republicans a fourth seat on the Court), the advantages of considering a Jewish nominee,
and the president’s desire to appoint “an open-minded, judicious liberal.” When Fortas
proved resistant to the president’s overtures the White House arranged for the
intervention of Justice Douglas, who was one of Fortas’ original mentors at Yale. Fortas
was eventually “ambushed” into accepting the nomination, and he quickly joined the
Warren-Douglas-Brennan wing of the Court. 58
Johnson was also single-minded about appointing Thurgood Marshall to the
Supreme Court. After appointing him solicitor general to replace the retiring Archibald
Cox, Johnson designed a political maneuver that he hoped would force conservative
justice Tom Clark from the bench (a much better exchange than the Fortas-for-Goldberg
deal, which maintained but did not increase the Court’s newly-constructed liberal
majority). The plan was for LBJ to name Clark’s son, Ramsey Clark, as attorney general
(replacing Katzenbach, who left to become undersecretary of state) and thus create a
perceived “conflict of interest.” As Johnson told Ramsey Clark, “if my judgment is that
you become attorney general, he [Tom Clark] would have to leave the Court. For no
other reason than the public appearance of an old man sitting on his boy’s case. Every
taxi driver in the country, he’d tell me that the old man couldn’t judge fairly what his old
boy is sending up (laughter).” 59 Johnson was especially delighted that Marshall would be
a completely reliable “liberal…chalk it up there 100 percent of the time.” Ramsey Clark
suggested that Marshall might be a liberal on civil rights but more moderate on criminal
56
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justice (“he reflects an older generation’s attitude”) but Johnson didn’t think so. “I think
we’d have to put Marshall on the Court…. And my judgment is with Hugo Black, Bill
Douglas, the Chief, Abe Fortas … they’ll just have a field day,” not just on civil rights
but on a range of constitutional issues, including the rights of criminal defendants.
(Johnson quipped, “They wouldn’t send a man to the penitentiary by God for raping a
woman if you had a photograph of him.”) 60 Just as planned, when Johnson announced
the appointment of Ramsey Clark, the new attorney general’s father immediately
announced that he would resign from the Court at the end of the current term.
Johnson’s final opportunity to fortify the liberal bloc on the Supreme Court came
in June 1968 when Earl Warren conveyed his intention to retire. This sort of “strategic
retirement” is a common way for justices to influence the Court’s constitutional
policymaking; Warren knew that his constitutional agenda would be better protected if
the selection emerged from a Democratic president (and Senate) than if it came from a
Republican president, and by the spring of 1968 Democrats had every reason to be
worried about whether they would be able to hold onto the White House. 61 (Warren sent
word that he wanted to meet with the self-proclaimed lame-duck president on June 11,
less than a week after Robert Kennedy was assassinated.) Once again Johnson
considered his top adviser Fortas, who had continued to be a loyal servant of the present
(by attending meetings and drafting speeches and executive orders) even after joining the
Court. As David Yalof put it (citing the recollections of Joseph Califano), “Johnson
viewed the Court as a means both of perpetuating his social reforms and of upholding
various legislative compromises he had reached on controversial issues ranging from aid
for parochial schools to consumer, health, and environmental legislation. Who better to
protect the president’s legacy than Fortas, who had played a key role in drafting much of
that legislation in the first place?” 62
To take over Fortas’ spot as an associate justice Johnson quickly focused on his
old friend Judge William “Homer” Thornberry of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit and a “political clone of LBJ: a moderate-liberal Texan … who supported civil
rights for minorities and liberal protections for free speech.” 63 However, despite
Johnson’s intention to have his agenda retreat into the judiciary, the opportunities for
political entrenchment were diminishing. Presidents historically have a more difficult
time with Senate confirmation during the fourth year of their term. Compounding that
conventional problem was Johnson’s headstrong decision (against the advice of Secretary
of Defense Clark Clifford and White House special counsel Larry Temple)
simultaneously to nominate two old personal friends. Republicans from outside their
own Senate leadership (led by Robert Griffin of Michigan and George Murphy of
California) circulated a petition in the Senate cloakroom opposing any action on the
60
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nominations before the November elections. Proceedings went forward anyway, and
opponents assaulted Fortas with criticisms of controversial Warren Court rulings,
allegations of impropriety with respect to Fortas’ ongoing relationship to the president,
and revelations that Fortas had improperly accepted a huge lecture fee ($15,000) for
participating in several college seminars (arranged by his former law partner). When
Democrats were unable to kill a filibuster (led by Republicans but also supported by
Georgia’s powerful Democratic Senator Richard B. Russell, who felt betrayed when
Ramsey Clark temporarily held up a federal judgeship that Russell sponsored), Fortas
asked Johnson to withdraw his nomination. 64 In mid-October Johnson threw in the towel,
announcing that Warren’s replacement would be determined by the winner of the
upcoming presidential election. 65
As it turns out, even with the failure produced by this final overreaching,
Democratic efforts to transform the federal judiciary in the 1960s were remarkably
successful. Kennedy inherited a federal judiciary that was evenly split between
Republicans and Democrats. By the end of Johnson’s administration over 70% of judges
in this enlarged judiciary were appointed by Democratic presidents—more than 39% by
Johnson himself. 66 In 1970 a Republican was in the White House and Democrats
controlled the House and Senate by margins of 57% and 56% respectively; that same
year, Democrats made up 63% of circuit court judges and 66% of district court judges.
Moreover, even with the need to accommodate senatorial courtesy during the
appointment process, these judges turned out to have remarkably liberal voting records.
One study, examining the “percentage of liberal decisions rendered by district court
appointees” of various twentieth century presidents found Kennedy’s appointees reaching
more liberal outcomes than Eisenhower appointees; Johnson’s judges were significantly
more liberal. 67 A study of court of appeals decisions between 1961 and 1964 found that
64
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“the Democrats appear relatively more ‘liberal’ than Republicans in cases which involve
what might be called ‘economic liberalism’” but “equally ‘liberal’ on the criminal and
civil liberties categories”; 68 however, after the Kennedy and Johnson appointees had a
chance to establish their record, the effects of liberal entrenchment on decisions across
the board became more pronounced. In particular, Johnson court of appeals judges had
the highest liberalism score on issues relating to civil liberties and criminal procedure,
compared to all other judges categorized by appointing president; Nixon’s judges had the
lowest liberalism scores on these issues. 69
Similar changes were also apparent in the Supreme Court. Between 1958 and
1962 due process claims represented around 21 percent of the Supreme Court’s docket;
this rate grew to 31 percent during the 1968 through 1972 terms. Similarly, between
1958 and 1962 equality claims represented five percent of the Court’s docket, compared
to 12 percent between 1968 and 1972. As a percentage of the Supreme Court’s overall
docket civil liberties claims skyrocketed in the latter part of the 1960s, while claims over
federal regulation and economic matters declined dramatically. 70 A Supreme Court that,
under Eisenhower, handed down “liberal” decisions in civil liberties cases 58 percent of
the time now voted liberal in approximately 75% of cases during the Johnson
administration. This is no surprise, given that Kennedy and Johnson justices were
significantly more liberal than the justices they replaced. 71
IV. Partisan Entrenchment and the Politics of Constitutional Change
What Powe calls “History’s Warren Court”—the Court that would usher in
modern liberal constitutional jurisprudence—came into being in 1962 precisely because
of Kennedy’s commitment to Warren’s constitutional vision, and it persisted throughout
the decade because Johnson also aligned himself with the Court’s liberal wing. 72 White
and Goldberg together might have constituted the fifth and sixth votes for a solid liberal
majority, but White was much less reliable on criminal procedure and civil liberties than
he was on civil rights, and so it was the New Frontiersman Goldberg who (initially)
became the pivot point for constitutional change. His 89 percent liberal voting record
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was second only to Douglas’. This fifth vote majority continued when Goldberg was
replaced by Fortas (a protégé of Douglas), who voted with Warren 83-92 percent of the
time, and was fortified in 1967 when Marshall replaced Clark. 73
Powe is essentially correct that, during this period, the Court was (by design) “a
functioning part of the Kennedy-Johnson liberalism of the mid and late 1960s.” 74
Kennedy, who had to face questions about the separation of church and state during his
presidential campaign, actively supported the Court’s school prayer decisions. The
justices declared the poll tax unconstitutional only after Congress encouraged the Justice
Department to challenge those laws in federal court. The justices turned back legal
challenges to the Vietnam War, and allowed (by a vote of 7-1) for the prosecution of
protestors who burned their draft cards. 75 In New York Times v. Sullivan the Court
shielded the national press against harassing lawsuits from Southern officials and thus
helped ensure a favorable media climate for passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. In
reviewing civil rights legislation the Court provided forceful declarations of
congressional power, thus “extending an offer to Congress to become a full partner” with
the Court to promote the vision of the Great Society. 76
This partnership was partially reciprocated in 1965, when the Johnson
administration created the Legal Services Program as part of the Office of Economic
Opportunity, as an adjunct of the War on Poverty. The goal of the office was to give the
poor greater access to courts—and, by so doing, give the justices greater opportunities to
advance a more liberal agenda. 77 The LSP’s Supreme Court docket raised a wide variety
of legal issues, including constitutional questions involving claims of equal protection,
due process, the first amendment, criminal procedure, and access to courts. 78 When the
Court first decided a case in favor of welfare recipients it was in a lawsuit sponsored by
the LSP; similarly, the landmark case Shapiro v. Thompson (1969), striking down
residency requirements for welfare recipients, was also made possible by that program.
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More generally, during its nine-year tenure, the LSP sponsored 164 cases before the
Supreme Court, 119 of which were accepted for review. The eighty cases that received
plenary consideration represented 7 percent of all written opinions handed down by the
Supreme Court during this era. 79 The LSP’s success rate also inspired other liberal
organizations dedicated to civil rights and liberties to beef up their litigation so as to
“take full advantage of a favorable judicial climate.” 80 Not to be outdone, the justices, on
their own initiative, also made the Court more accessible to certain categories of litigants,
not just by nationalizing bill of rights protections but also through self-conscious
adjustments in standing requirements. 81
As a general matter it should be easy to accept that much of the Court’s
constitutional decision making during this period cannot be understood without situating
the Court in the larger context of 1960s Democratic Party politics. But it would also be
misleading to leave the impression that the newly reconstructed federal judiciary was
merely a harmonious partner with New Frontier and Great Society Democrats. To show
a political relationship between the Court and the dominant political coalition is not to
argue that the justices followed the instructions of party leaders. Even when the justices
were upholding features of the Democratic agenda they were also articulating specific
doctrines of constitutional law, and nobody in the White House or the Senate was
instructing the justices on the precise formulation of the constitutional tests associated
with (for example) school prayer, seditious libel, or the scope of Congress’ authority to
pass civil rights legislation. In this respect the justices often acted on their own initiative
and not as a mere agent or partner.
In fact, one of the features of political entrenchment in an institution that has
extremely broad policy-making jurisdiction is that the appointees’ ideological disposition
will inevitably manifest itself in ways that were not considered by the appointing parties.
Sometimes this leads to decision making that presidents and senators did not anticipate
but also do not oppose; other times it leads to unanticipated problems for the governing
coalition. The liberals were central in establishing the specific legal rationale for
Reynolds v. Sims (1964) (with Harlan dissenting and Clark and Stewart concurring).
Solicitor General Cox was pushed by the Kennedy White House to advocate a fairly
79
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egalitarian conception of reapportionment reform, but even he was surprised at the
sweeping nature of the decision. (One of the victorious plaintiffs remarked, “[w]e would
have been satisfied with less than we got,” and Anthony Lewis wrote in The New York
Times that “even some liberal-minded persons, admirers of the modern Supreme Court,
find themselves stunned.”) In the wake of the decision the House (over the objections of
the chairman of the Judiciary Committee) passed a jurisdiction-stripping bill, but liberal
senators successfully filibustered similar efforts, and by 1968 all the fuss had passed. 82
Similarly, the new liberal majority allowed Brennan to turn his dissenting opinion in
Braunfeld v. Brown (1961) into a majority opinion in Sherbert v. Verner (1963), thereby
rewriting the constitutional standard governing protections for religious freedom. 83
Maybe most notoriously (within the canonical history of American constitutional
development), the new liberal majority took the lead in constitutionalizing the regulation
of marital privacy and contraceptive use. The Court inherited by JFK ducked the issue in
Poe v. Ullman (1961), but by 1965 there was plenty of support for jumping into the
fray—even if there was no consensus among the justices over the proper constitutional
justification for striking down Connecticut’s antiquated ban on contraceptives. The
significance of Griswold v. Connecticut lay not so much with the development of any
coherent constitutional test, but with the signal that the Court was now in the business of
resolving disputes over infringements on personal freedoms. This was not a move that
either Black or Stewart considered appropriate, but there was a bipartisan consensus
among the other justices that it was proper for the Court to provide protections against
state intrusions into certain intimate decisions. Even the typically-restrained Harlan
agreed that the Court should use the due process clause to protect the unenumerated
freedom of married couples to use contraceptives. For the all the ink that would be
spilled in subsequent decades about the appropriateness of such a role for the Court, the
decision in Griswold itself was notably uncontroversial at the time, and the commitment
to judicial protection for personal liberties remains bipartisan to this day. 84
However, not all of the Court’s initiatives proved as uncontroversial, or as benign
for the Great Society coalition. After the well-regarded Gideon v. Wainwright in 1963,
the Court’s criminal procedure decisions proved extremely unpopular. 85 In Escobedo v.
Illinois (1964) a bare liberal majority (over the dissents of Harlan, Stewart, White, and
Clark) threw out an interrogation on the grounds that the suspect was questioned outside
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the presence of his lawyer, despite Escobedo’s repeated requests to see his lawyer (who
was in the station house trying to see his client). Goldberg’s opinion was interpreted as a
slap in the face of police efforts to get suspects to confess. 86 Complaints about liberal
judges undermining law enforcement did not do Barry Goldwater much good, but the
argument gained political traction after the urban rioting of 1965 and after public opinion
began responding to rising crime rates. The decision in Miranda v. Arizona (1966)
seemed to confirm the warnings of Court critics. This time, the five liberals imposed
sweeping new police reforms on the nation. (In Powe’s words: “Gideon required five
backward states to change their laws and behavior. Mapp required half the states to
change theirs. Miranda required all the states to change theirs.”) 87 The decision worked
against Democrats in the mid-term 1966 elections, where the question of urban riots,
“crime in the streets,” and “law and order” framed many races. Undeterred, the Court
hammered away at its agenda, ruling in 1967 that the government could not order a
lineup for a suspect without the presence of defense counsel.88 By 1968 many
congressional Democrats were looking for cover and found some by passing the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, which (among other things) attempted to overturn a
number of the Court’s criminal procedure decisions. 89 Still, the Court’s criminal
procedure liberalism was successfully used against the Democrats by Richard Nixon as
part of his “law-and-order” presidential bid in 1968. As candidate Nixon put it, certain
judges had “gone too far in weakening the peace forces as against the criminal forces.”
Because of the Fortas fiasco (which was made possible, in part, by Southern
Democratic opposition to Warren Court liberalism), Nixon was able to mitigate the
influence of the Kennedy and Johnson years on the U.S. Supreme Court. For his first
appointment to the Court, replacing Chief Justice Warren, Nixon chose someone who
was arguably the most prominent critic of the Warren Court in the federal judiciary, chief
judge of the D.C. Circuit Warren Burger. Nixon’s efforts to dis-entrench liberalism on
the U.S. Supreme Court continued with the nominee chosen to replace the retiring Fortas,
South Carolinian Clement Haynsworth Jr. of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, but Senate Democrats defeated the nomination. There was a similar fate
awaiting Georgian G. Harrold Carswell, when the Senate, for the first time in American
history, turned down a second consecutive presidential nomination for the Supreme
Court. The result of these battles was that Nixon was forced to turn to the more moderate
Harry Blackmun, who ended up voting in a liberal direction on civil liberties issues more
than half the time and who supported the liberal position on civil rights more than 61% of
the time. 90 Within a few years Black and Harlan retired and were replaced by Lewis
Powell (37% pro-civil liberties voting record) and William Rehnquist (21.8% pro-civil
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liberties voting record). 91 More generally, a Democratic Congress was extremely stingy
about authorizing new judgeships for a Republican president, and unlike virtually every
president since Grant, he left the White House with the judiciary still under the control of
the opposition party. 92
After Nixon the Court no longer had the sort of reliable liberal majority that
characterized the heyday of the Warren Court; only Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall
remained from that group. But to a considerable extent the constitutional innovations of
the 1960s remained alive even after changes in the Court’s personnel. While the
entrenchment of a majority of liberal judges did not survive for long, the entrenchment of
liberal constitutional policies continued for some time, at least in many areas of the law.
This was because Warren Court liberals were not merely deciding case outcomes; they
were constructing a series of “jurisprudential regimes”—that is, constitutional doctrines,
standards, and tests that framed the ways in which justices approached the issues in
particular cases—and most of these jurisprudential regimes were acceptable to the
Court’s new majorities. 93 The liberal justices’ innovations in free speech jurisprudence
survived. Expanded protections for free exercise of religion were embraced by Burger in
Wisconsin v. Yoder (1973), and Brennan’s approach in Sherbert remained the prevailing
framework for analyzing free exercise claims for a quarter century, until a more
conservative Court rolled back special protections for religious liberty in Employment
Division v. Smith (1988). 94 In the area of the establishment clause the unanimous
decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman built upon (and even expanded) the more separationist
approach advocated by the liberals in the 1960s. 95 Maybe most notably, the innovative
right to privacy (or freedom of choice over certain intimate decisions) was expanded in
Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972) and Roe v. Wade (1973)—with Burger dissenting in the
former but not the latter. 96 The entrenchment of these 1960s precedents was successful
enough that, by the mid-1980s, it could be said that the Burger Court was “the counterrevolution that wasn’t.” 97
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On the other hand, Nixon’s reconstructed Court was able to rollback some of the
Warren Court’s revolution in criminal procedure. For example, in Harris v. New York
(1971), the Miranda dissenters joined forces with Burger and Blackmun in holding that
confessions excluded under Miranda could be used to impeach a defendant’s trial
testimony; other exceptions to Miranda (and to the exclusionary rule) would follow. 98
The requirement that lineups be done in the presence of counsel was gutted when Nixon
appointees (over dissents by Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall) ruled that this right did not
attach prior to indictment. 99 Over the years similar steps were taken in other areas of
criminal procedure to reign in the vision of due process advanced in the mid-1960s.
However, even in this area of the law, some of the Warren Court’s innovations were quite
long-lasting, including the fundamental holding in Miranda itself, which was reiterated
by the Rehnquist Court as late as 2000. 100
V. Conclusion
Because of their embrace of the liberal wing of the Supreme Court, Kennedy and
Johnson set in motion an important constitutional legacy. The decisions of that era
fundamentally changed constitutional law in many areas, and a good number of those
changes persisted well after the liberals no longer constituted a majority on the Court. It
may not be overstating it to say that those decisions framed constitutional politics, and
constitutional theory, in the United States for a generation.
There were a number of factors that allowed 1960s constitutional decision making
to persist even after Republican appointees changed the Court’s composition. The
Congress remained under the control of the Democratic Party and this prevented the
appointment of justices who may have been more inclined to rollback Warren-era
precedents. Precedents such as Reynolds v. Sims, Sherbert v. Verner, or New York Times
v. Sullivan, while revolutionary at the time, were largely accepted by the late 1960s (or at
least had become uncontroversial) and thus were easy enough for new justices to embrace
(or at least tolerate). Largely changes in the political system—such as the women’s
movement—provided a political context whereby the liberalization of certain
constitutional norms was increasingly acceptable to moderates in both parties.
Still, it is unlikely that liberal constitutionalism would have emerged without the
efforts of Kennedy and Johnson to create reliable liberal majorities on the Supreme
Court. Their appointments turned over the authorship of path-breaking opinions to the
most liberal justices every appointed; thus, rather than grudging or constrained
accommodation of constitutional change, the Court took the lead and offered a full
embrace. In the language of New Institutionalist scholarship, these developments
highlight the role of sequencing and dynamics of path dependency on the specific shape
of constitutional change. If Nixon had won the 1960 election, or if Kennedy and Johnson
preferred to marginalize the judiciary by fortifying the Harlan-Frankfurter wing of the
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Court, then it is difficult to imagine a scenario whereby similar precedents have an
opportunity to earn the respect or toleration of later Court majorities. Then again, all
such imagined alternative histories are matters of speculation. In the actual history of
American constitutional development in the 1960s the changes in our constitutional
practices came about because of choices made by those who appointed the justices.
The political consequences of these efforts were less straightforward than
Democrats would have preferred. Kennedy and Johnson certainly created a partner in
promoting many features of Great Society liberalism. The Court also took the lead in
other policy areas that were broadly acceptable to the party. At the same time, the
justices articulated constitutional views that proved politically damaging to the
Democrats, both in 1966 and 1968. It is, if you will, a “non-equilibrium” account of
political change, as well as one that incorporates unintended consequences.
Nevertheless, there is reason to believe that parties consider the potential
unanticipated consequences of partisan entrenchment in the judiciary to be outweighed
by the advantages of having sympathetic decision makers in relatively insulated policymaking institutions. After all, one of the explicit goals of the Reagan Justice Department
was to use judicial appointments, not simply to reverse some of the more unwelcome
features of the modern judicial liberalism, but also to institutionalize key features of the
political agenda of the New Right, including a rollback of the scope of federal power over
commerce and civil rights and an expansion in the idea of state sovereignty. The Office
of Legal Policy under Reagan prepared a 199-page guide to judicial appointments,
entitled The Constitution in the Year 2000: Choices Ahead in Constitutional
Interpretation, which was premised on the assumption that “There are few factors that are
more critical to determining the course of the Nation, and yet more often overlooked,
than the values and philosophies of the men and women who populate the third co-equal
branch of the national government—the federal judiciary.” 101 The Reagan and Bush I
White Houses appointed four of the five justices who are now know as the “federalism
five” and elevated the fifth to the position of Chief Justice. 102 As we turn our efforts to
understanding American constitutional development in the years since the Warren Court,
we may again find that it is as important to pay attention to the decisions made by power
holders outside the judiciary as it is to examine the constitutional vision and institutional
circumstances of the justices themselves.
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